

CHAPTER XLV

A SYSTEM OF NATIONAL SERVICE

IN war the ultimate problem is man-power. It was in the last resort the number, calibre, equipment and training of the men that made or worked *Man-power* *fact* machinery of war or sustained the *Essential in war* of the nation during the War > that would decide whether we could endure to the end where victory awaits. It is not necessarily the strongest nation that wins, but the one that has made the best use of its strength. By the end of the third campaign, man-power in all the countries engaged in the struggle was reaching the point of exhaustion. Germany had *Growing* made a better use of machinery, engineer-*aU countries in skill and* intelligent training to save her men than any other nation in the fight. In spite, therefore, of the enormous front on which her armies fought, and the hundreds of battles in which they had been engaged, West, East and South-East, her casualties were lower in proportion to the numbers of her fighting men than those of any other army on either side. The sanguinary attack on Verdun was planned on the principle that the machine was to take the leading part in crushing the defence. The result was that although it was a German offensive against Frenchmen protected by

tremendous forts, the defenders lost
more men than

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